avoidance doctrine

26 examples (0.01 sec)
  • The third rule of the avoidance doctrine requires federal courts facing constitutional issues to rule no more broadly than the precise facts require.
  • The avoidance doctrine as set out in these rules functions primarily as a supplement to established doctrines of standing and ripeness.
  • Brandeis, a leader of the progressive movement prior to his judicial appointment offered a broad framing of the avoidance doctrine.
  • In addition to maintaining appropriate power relations among the national branches, the final two justifications for the avoidance doctrine also encompass federalism concerns.
  • Despite those constitutional linkages, however, the avoidance doctrine is most commonly classified as a prudential rule of judicial self-restraint.
  • Indeed, the avoidance doctrine may be an early formulation of the justiciability doctrines.
  • These elements demonstrate a significant overlap between the avoidance doctrine and other jurisdictional or justiciability barriers.
  • Another justification for the avoidance doctrine is the "paramount importance of constitutional adjudication in our system."
  • Brandeis then relied on the avoidance doctrine to argue that the Court should not reach the merits of the constitutional issue.
  • Rules three and five of the avoidance doctrine thus echo concerns addressed by the constitutional and prudential limitations of standing and ripeness.
  • The sixth rule of the avoidance doctrine provides that a court will not rule upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has benefitted from the statute.
  • Cases construing the prudential component of the standing doctrine have relied on the avoidance doctrine.
  • The first two rules of the avoidance doctrine are, thus, closely linked to well-recognized justiciability requirements, and serve as alternative, but not distinctive, limitations on the federal judicial power.
  • In Ashwander, Justice Brandeis identified seven components of the avoidance doctrine.
  • The avoidance doctrine is also premised on "the inherent limitations of the judicial process, arising especially from its largely negative character and limited resources of enforcement."
  • To the extent the question involves statutory construction and a plausible interpretation of the statute might obviate the need for constitutional review, this example replicates the seventh rule of the avoidance doctrine.
  • The second rule of the avoidance doctrine mirrors the ripeness requirement in that it obliges federal courts to refrain from deciding a dispute prematurely.
  • The seventh rule of the avoidance doctrine derives from the familiar canon of statutory construction that a statute "ought not to be construed to violate the Constitution if any other possible construction remains available."
  • The dissent imbued the avoidance doctrine with constitutional weight by relying on earlier Supreme Court precedent relating the avoidance doctrine to the case or controversy requirement.
  • In a leading case on ripeness, Poe v. Ullman, the Court relied on the avoidance doctrine to set the stage for its decision that the controversy was not ripe.
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